Gauss on infinity  by Waterhouse, William C
Historia Mathematics 6 (1979), 430-436 
GAUSS ON INFINITY 
BY WILLIAM C. WATERHOUSE 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY PARK, PA 16802 
SUMMARIES 
In opposing the use of completed infinity in 
mathematics, Gauss was making a valid criticism of 
one particular kind of argument. His celebrated 
statement has no connection with the set theory to 
which it was later applied. 
Gauss cum dixisset quantitates infinitas geo- 
metris esse evitandas, de errore quodam certo recte 
monuit. Sententia haec notissima ad doctrinam acer- 
vorum minime pertinet. 
L'opposition de Gauss 2 l'emploi des quantit& 
infinies provenait d'une erreur g&om&rique incon- 
testable, et n'avait rien 2 faire avec la theorie 
des ensembles. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a famous sentence Gauss once wrote, "I protest against 
the use of an infinite quantity as something completed, which 
is never permissible in mathematics." Kline's widely read 
history quotes this passage in the section headed "The Concept 
of an Infinite Set," where the previous paragraph deals with 
Galileo's paradox on infinite sets, and the following sentence 
begins, "Cauchy, like others before him, denied the existence 
of infinite sets..." [Kline 1972, 9931. Similarly, a substan- 
tial recent paper on Cantor assumes without question that the 
words imply a full-fledged finitism: 
. . . 3 is not as close to the true value of TI as 
is 3.14, and 3.14159 is still closer. By adding ad- 
ditional places to the right of the decimal, it is 
possible to approximate the true value of A as closely 
as one likes. But Gauss insisted that one could not 
assume all the terms of the decimal expansion to be 
given to determine TT exactly. To do so would involve 
an infinite number of terms, and thus comprise an 
actually infinite set of numbers, which Gauss refused 
to aflow in rigorous mathematics [Dauben 1977, 861. 
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Interpretations like these seem to be fairly common. But 
actually, as we shall see, such a meaning was not intended by 
Gauss and only became attached to his words half a century later. 
2. SCHUMACHER ON THE PARALLEL POSTULATE 
The story begins with the following proof of the parallel 
postulate. Recall first that it is enough to show that the 
sum of the angles of a triangle is 180°. Now extend the sides 
of a triangle ABC [Fig. 11, and choose a radius so large that 
in relation to it the sides are as small as you like. With 
this radius draw around C the semicircle DEFG. The arc DE then 
measures the angle DCE. But AC is negligible compared with the 
radius, so A and C essentially coincide, and the arc FG measures 
the angle FAG. Similarly EF measures EBF = ABC. Thus the sum 
of the angles is 180'; or, to be precise, we have shown that it 
differs from 180' by less than an arbitrarily small amount. 
This proof was sent to Gauss by his friend H. Schumacher in 
1831. The next letter from Gauss made no mention of it, and so 
Schumacher wrote specifically asking for an opinion: 
You can easily imagine that your judgment is very 
important to me, since you so easily discover every 
weakness in a proof.... If anyone should think (though 
I do not) that a proof is needed for the proposition 
that one can consider the vertices of a triangle as 
coinciding centers of a circle of infinite radius . . . . 
this proof can be rigorously carried through [Gauss 
1900, 2141. 
3. GAUSS ON SCHUMACHER'S PROOF 
Gauss replied at once. To simplify the discussion, he re- 
duced the argument to its basic point [Fig.2]: 
(1) In a triangle where one side is finite but the second 
and third are infinite, the two angles at the finite side add 
to 180". 
He restated Schumacher's proof in this case, showing how the 
FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
general result followed from it, and continued: 
As for your proof of (l), I protest first of all 
against the use of an infinite quantity as a completed 
one, which is never permissible in mathematics. The 
infinite is only a fayon de parler, where one is really 
speaking of limits to which certain ratios come as 
close as one likes while others are allowed to grow 
without restriction. In this sense Non-Euclidean ge- 
ometry contains nothing at all contradictory. No doubt 
people must think many of its results paradoxical at 
first, but to think this contradictory would be only 
self-deception.... 
In the case in question, now, when the points A, 
B and the direction AC are given and C can grow with- 
out bound, there is nothing at all contradictory in 
saying that, though angle DBC comes closer and closer 
to DAC, yet the difference can never be reduced below 
a definite finite amount [Gauss 1900, 216-2171. 
4. GAUSS ON INFINITY 
Here, in context, we have Gauss' famous statement. Schumacher 
in his reply said he did not think he had assumed any actual 
infinity, and indeed none appears in his proof. But the second 
letter shows that he believed the crucial step because he thought 
of it intuitively as saying that the vertices of a triangle were 
coinciding centers of a circle of infinite radius. Thus Gauss' 
remark is quite to the point. There is no harm in using the 
intuitively appealing language of behavior at infinity, but one 
must be prepared to demonstrate in detail the statements thus 
abbreviated, since they may not be as "obvious" as they seem. 
At the very least, as Schumacher's proof shows, they may involve 
nontrivial assumptions. 
Gauss had understood this long before. In his thesis (1799), 
for instance, his idea is essentially to write f(x + iy) = 
P(x, y) + iQ(x, y) and prove the fundamental theorem of algebra 
by showing that the algebraic plane curves P(x, y) = 0 and 
Q(x, y) = 0 must intersect. At one point, working in polar co- 
ordinates r,4 around an origin C, he writes: 
At an infinite distance from the point C the 
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first curve, with equation 
sinm$ +$sin(m-l)$ + 2 sin(m- 2)$ etc. = 0, 
coincides with that curve whose equation is sin m+=O . . . 
The first curve therefore has 2m infinite branches . . . 
IStruik 1969, 117-1181. 
This of course is perfectly satisfactory if one is sure of 
what it means. But since the thesis began with a criticism of 
other attempted proofs, Gauss does not want to leave any doubt, 
and so, since "somereaders might be offended by infinitely 
large quantities," he proceeds to translate the argument ex- 
plicitly into a collection of estimates and inequalities. 
As we see again here, when Gauss spoke of infinity in mathe- 
matics, he referred specifically to the analytic/geometric in- 
tuition of behavior at infinity. He did not object to the use 
of such language. Later in the letter to Schumacher, for 
instance, he takes a formula about circumferences of circles 
in Non-Euclidean geometry and restates it "in the metaphorical 
language of infinity"; and as we saw, Schumacher's original 
proof did not even mention infinity explicitly. Gauss' objec- 
tion reduces precisely to this: here as elsewhere, geometric 
intuition is no substitute for proof. In establishing results 
in ordinary geometry or analysis, one is not entitled casually 
to assume statements about behavior at infinity. Needless to 
say, this is not a controversial statement; Gauss is (as usual) 
unquestionably right. 
5. OTHERS ON INFINITY 
Not everyone perhaps saw the point as clearly as Gauss, but 
it was hardly a new idea in his time. Careful students of the 
calculus had been saying similar things for many years, about 
infinity as well as about infinitesimals. The famous early 
examples are in the articles by D'Alembert in the Encyclopbdie: 
"D'Alembert said that . . . the differential notation is to be 
considered merely as a convenient abridgment or manner of speak- 
ing, used to avoid the circumlocution necessary in expressing 
the limit concept." Similarly, "he asserted . . . that the notion 
of infinity . . . is only a convenient abridgment for the inter- 
pretation in terms of the doctrine of limits" [Boyer 1949, 248- 
2491. A decade before 1831 this development had already reached 
its apex in Cauchy's Cours d'llnalyse, where infinitesimal x and 
infinite x were explicitly defined to mean variable x approach- 
ing zero or growing beyond all bounds [Cauchy 1897, 37-381. Nor 
was the idea limited to France; it appeared (with mild confusion) 
in a popular German textbook published in 1761 by A. G. K%atner 
[Boyer 1949, 250). We may recall that KXstner was the mathe- 
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matics professor at Gijttingen; he was almost eighty when Gauss 
came there as a student, and Gauss (to put it mildly) did not 
consider him an outstanding mathematician (see e.g. [Kline 
1972, 7541). Thus when Gauss called infinity a manner of speak- 
ing about limits, he probably felt he was repeating a truism, 
and Schumacher accepted it without objection. 
Since that time, other mathematical concepts have been intro- 
duced bearing the name "infinity." Abraham Robinson, for 
instance, defined infinite and infinitesimal numbers as certain 
elements of "nonstandard models," proving that such models exist 
and that certain conclusions can be transferred from them to 
ordinary numbers [Robinson 19661. This to be sure is still 
demonstrably equivalent to a theory of limits. But projective 
geometers introduced a purely algebraic definition using homo- 
geneous coordinates, and it leads to points at infinity even 
over fields where no ordinary notion of limits exists. Yet no 
one, I suspect, will be tempted to cite Gauss as an opponent of 
homogeneous coordinates: their validity is not at all contro- 
versial, and it would be plain that Gauss had no such thing in 
mind. By examining his discussion of "infinity," we have seen 
that it likewise had for him no connection with set theory. 
But the controversy arising in that area led to misinterpreta- 
tion. 
6. CANTOR ON INFINITY 
Several different mathematical senses of "infinity" were 
known to Cantor; in one paper he discusses points at infinity 
in function theory and variables growing without bound, as well 
as his own "infinite numbers" [Cantor 1932, 165-1661. But 
"infinity" also meant much more to him. It must be remembered 
that the phrase "actual infinity," arising from the general 
Aristotelian distinction of 'potential" and "actual," was not 
basically a technical term in mathematics. It had of course 
been used in discussions of the foundations of the calculus. 
But it had also had a flourishing career in medieval theology 
and philosophy, and philosophy and religion played a major role 
in Cantor's later writings on infinity. 
The reason for this is partly psychological. In mathematics, 
Cantor's set theory was under attack as a questionable new 
subject. By putting his work in a philosophical context, he 
could consider it as a contribution to a long-standing debate. 
"The existence of the actually infinite," though often denied, 
had at least been debated by metaphysicians for centuries, and 
Cantor's work indeed attracted the interest of several the- 
ologians and philosophers [Dauben 19771. As Meschkowski writes, 
Cantor "saw in his theory a modern confirmation of scholastic 
theories on the actually infinite. It is understandable that 
the investigator, criticized by many of his contemporaries, 
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sought confirmation where it could be found: in discussion with 
Catholic theologicans" [Meschkowski 1965, 5101. Moreover, the 
religious feeling was by no means absent; Cantor was quite ready 
to say that opponents of infinity suffered from a "shortsighted- 
ness that robs them of the possibility of seeing the actually 
infinite, though in its highest, absolute bearer it created and 
preserves us... " [Cantor 1932, 374-2751. He was also prepared to 
defend "actual infinity" metaphysically, believing that his set 
theory was a valid mathematical interpretation of it. 
7. CANTOR ON GAUSS 
References to Gauss in connection with set theory apparently 
all go back to a comment published by Cantor himself- In an 
article of 1885 (published 1886) he wrote: 
It is just two years ago that Herr Rudolf Lipschitz 
in Bonn drew my attention to a certain place in the 
Gauss-Schumacher correspondence where the former 
speaks out against any introduction of actual in- 
finity into mathematics (Letter of 12 July 1831). 
I answered thoroughly, and on this point did not 
accept the authority of Gauss, which I respect so 
highly in all other areas. .." [Cantor 1932, 3711. 
This in isolation makes it seem that Cantor considered Gauss 
an opponent of his set theory. But as one follows his discussion 
it becomes clear that this disagreement is only with the words, 
not with Gauss' actual ideas. The crucial sentence is this: 
. . . a justified antipathy to such illegitimate 
actual infinity has produced in broad areas of science, 
under the influence of the modern epicurean-material- 
istic trend, a certain Horror Infiniti which dis- 
covers its classical expression and support in the 
cited writing of Gauss. . . [Cantor 1932, 3741. 
Thus Cantor objected not to Gauss' statement in context but 
to the meaning attributed to it by his own contemporaries. He 
had a new mathematical theory with which he could reasonably 
associate the term "actual infinity" with all its philosophical 
implications and religious resonance. In this sense Cantor was 
ready to defend "actual infinity in mathematics" against any- 
one, even against someone quoting Gauss. He knew, however, 
that Gauss had been referring only to an "illegitimate" infinity 
standing for limits, and he had already explained that his in- 
finite numbers had "nothing at all in common with" such ideas 
[Cantor 1932, 1661. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The term "actual infinity" comes from philosophy, and does 
not refer specifically to any single mathematical idea. When 
Gauss opposed the use of a completed infinity in mathematics, 
he was employing language familiar at his time to refer to a 
particular kind of argument. The example prompting his. state- 
ment illustrates why his opinion on the point in question is 
now universally accepted. However, since the philosophical term 
was ambiguous, Cantor later could equally well apply it to his 
own mathematical results, and this led Lipschitz to interpret 
Gauss' words as a Kroneckerian opposition to set theory. As 
A. Fraenkel carefully put it, Gauss' authority "contributed to 
his remark being followed in an unrestricted sense" [Fraenkel 
1966, 11. There is no indication that Gauss himself intended 
such a meaning. 
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